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ALLOCATING POWER: TOWARD A NEW 
FEDERALISM BALANCE FOR ELECTRICITY 
TRANSMISSION SITING   
Kevin Decker* 
Expansion and improvement of the nation’s electricity transmission system are 
crucial for increasing the amount of electricity generated by renewable energy 
sources.1  Renewable energy sources, such as wind and tidal, tend to be located far 
from population centers, and electricity transmission lines must bridge that gap.2   
In addition to its importance for meeting renewable energy goals, a better 
connected and more robust transmission system also bolsters reliability because it 
can draw on many generation sources in the event that a generator or segment of 
the transmission network fails. 3  And transmission facilitates generator competition 
by making it possible to transport lower-cost electricity from one part of the 
country to another area with higher electricity prices.4 
Unfortunately, the current regulatory regime for siting transmission facilities 
has proven to be a barrier to needed transmission development.  Historically, states 
have authority over physical siting of transmission lines whereas the federal 
government and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) have had 
jurisdiction over the actual interstate transmission and sale of electricity.  This 
division of power still exists today, despite recent legislative and regulatory 
attempts to overcome the limitations of the current federalism balance.  With a 
focus on transmission challenges in Maine and New England, this Comment 
explores the current regulatory model and its balance of power between the federal 
and state governments and evaluates solutions proposed by commentators. 
The need for transmission is especially critical to meet New England’s future 
renewable energy goals.5  And this need may be more pressing than previously 
thought.  The transmission grid operation for New England, ISO-NE, sent a 
memorandum to its stakeholders in June 2013 explaining that transmission 
constraints made it necessary to curtail output from wind generators.6  The 
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 1. See Michael Dworkin et al., Energy Transmission and Storage, in THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: 
EFFICIENCY AND RENEWABLES 531, 546 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2011).  A recent study by Stanford 
researchers concluded that it was feasible for New York State to rely completely on renewable energy in 
the coming decades, but this would require expedited transmission development.  Mark Z. Jacobson et 
al., Examining the Feasibility of Converting New York State’s All-Purpose Energy Infrastructure to One 
Using Wind, Water, and Sunlight, 57 ENERGY POL’Y 585, 598-99 (2013). 
 2. See Dworkin, supra note 1, at 546. 
 3. See MATTHEW H. BROWN & RICHARD P. SEDANO, NAT'L COUNCIL ON ELEC. POL’Y, 
ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION: A PRIMER 7-11 (2004). 
 4. See id. 
 5. NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., EASTERN WIND INTEGRATION AND TRANSMISSION STUDY 
27 (rev. 2011) [hereinafter EWITS].  
 6. Memorandum from Eric Wilkinson, External Affairs, ISO-NE, to New England Stakeholders 
(June 28, 2013), http://www.iso-ne.com/pubs/pubcomm/corr/2013/curtailment_summary_2013.pdf 
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memorandum noted that there were 700 megawatts of installed wind energy 
capacity at the start of 2013 and that another 2,053 megawatts of capacity were in 
the study pipeline.7  These new generation facilities tend to be located near weaker, 
lower voltage (e.g., 115 kV) transmission lines, “in areas with the least robust 
transmission facilities” that were “not designed to accommodate the addition of 
generation sources or the movement of large amounts of power.”8 
Much of the academic literature on electricity transmission focuses on 
Midwestern and Western states.9  This is understandably so, given the potential for 
renewable energy generation in those locations and the comparatively greater 
distances between generation sites and cities.  This Comment addresses 
transmission challenges generally, but also focuses on the regulatory regimes in 
Maine and other New England states.  Also, unlike most Western states, states in 
the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions belong to Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTOs), which present different challenges and solutions.10 
The present shortfall of transmission capacity is in part attributable to a 
mismatch between an early twentieth century regulatory framework and twenty-
first century problems.  Part I of this Comment begins with a sketch of the 
historical development of the electricity industry and its regulators, in order to 
comprehend and diagnose the current regulatory challenges confronting 
transmission development.  Part II then turns to state regulation of electricity 
transmission in Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. 
                                                                                                     
[hereinafter Wilkinson Memo].  See also Wilson Ring & David Sharp, Wind Power Systems Hit Hurdles, 
BOS. GLOBE, Aug. 9, 2013, http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/08/08/challenge-for-wind-power-
can-reaching-customers/FYloeNteh7ZliwZuEesgPL/story.html; Tux Turkel, Inadequate Transmission 
Lines Keeping Some Maine Wind Power Off The Grid, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Aug. 4, 2013, 
http://www.pressherald.com/news/there-is-a-problem-withwind-power-in-maine_2013-08-04.html. 
 7. Wilkinson Memo, supra note 6. 
 8. Id.  The constraints on the New England electricity grid and their effect on energy generation 
mirror constraints on the region’s natural gas transmission system.  Many policymakers see natural gas 
as making renewables less favorable in the short term or as a bridge fuel source between other fossil 
fuels and renewable energy, but as recently as the winter of 2012-2013 New England experienced 
problems with natural gas pipeline congestion and scarcity.  See Grid Chief Warns of New England 
Power Issues, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Mar. 19, 2013, http://www.pressherald.com/news/Grid-chief-
warns-of-future-NE-power-problems.html; Matthew L. Wald, In New England, a Natural Gas Trap, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/16/business/electricity-costs-up-in-gas-
dependent-new-england.html. Gordon van Welie, President and CEO of ISO-New England, testified 
before the House Subcommittee on Energy and Power that New England’s natural gas pipeline 
infrastructure is inadequate to accommodate the region’s increased reliance on natural gas as an 
electricity source.  Testimony of Gordon van Welie, H. Subcomm. on Energy & Power, American 
Energy Security and Innovation: The Role of Regulators and Grid Operators in Meeting Natural Gas 
and Electric Coordination Challenges (March 19, 2013), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/ 
IF/IF03/20130319/100527/HHRG-113-IF03-Wstate-vanWelieG-20130319-U1.pdf.  Van Welie noted 
that utilities have retired coal and nuclear power plants in favor of natural gas fired plants and that New 
England now derives fifty-two percent of its electricity from natural gas. Id. 
 9. See, e.g., Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in A Changed Milieu: 
Evolving Notions of the "Public Interest" in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 705 (2010). 
 10. See Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO)—
Industries, Electric, Industry Activities, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC), 
http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last updated Aug. 28, 2013).  For the FERC 
order creating RTOs see Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810 (Jan. 6, 2000). 
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After canvassing the history leading up to the current transmission regulatory 
structure, Part III of this Comment turns to defining the federalism problem 
confronting electricity transmission.  The overlapping jurisdiction between states, 
regional entities, and the federal government over transmission cost allocation, 
planning, and siting creates numerous opportunities for interested parties to delay 
or even kill a transmission project.  Part III explores this problem with several 
theories of administrative regulation and federalism.  Part IV then analyzes FERC 
Order 100011 as an attempt to address this problem. 
Although on the whole Order 1000 seems like a step toward a better regulatory 
scheme for electricity transmission planning, it is far from a total solution.  Even if 
it addressed issues involved with cost allocation and planning, barriers to siting 
planned and funded transmission projects would still exist.  Part IV, therefore, 
critically evaluates potential solutions suggested by commentators.  The first 
solution is simple and blunt—avoid the localized interests and collective action 
problems that stymie transmission development by completely preempting state 
authority over transmission siting.12  The second, more moderate approach is 
coordinated13 or process preemption, in which states retain decision-making 
authority cabined by federally-defined standards and procedures.14  A third solution 
would allow states to retain authority over transmission siting approval, but 
increase the FERC’s limited “backstop” authority to intervene in the event of state 
delay, recalcitrance, or even denial.  A fourth solution is for states to reform their 
process for siting transmission projects.15  In the end, however, a fifth approach is 
perhaps the best solution: vesting siting authority in Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTOs) or regional transmission planning entities.  Finally, potential 
state-level reforms are considered, especially reforms that Western states have 
adopted.16  Part V concludes. 
I. THE PAST AND PRESENT OF THE ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY AND ITS REGULATION  
Generation, transmission, and distribution are the three primary components of 
the electricity industry.17  Generators produce electricity from various fuel sources, 
including coal, natural gas, nuclear energy, dams, and, more recently, wind, solar, 
and tidal energy.18  Once generated, the transmission system transports electricity 
                                                                                                     
 11. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public 
Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Order 1000]. 
 12. See Sandeep Vaheesan, Preempting Parochialism and Protectionism in Power, 49 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 87, 123-28 (2012). 
 13. See JIM ROSSI, REGULATORY BARGAINING AND PUBLIC LAW 215 (2005). 
 14. See Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 289, 321 (2011); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges 
for Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1865 (2012). 
 15. See ROSSI, supra note 13, at 219-20. 
 16. See Brown & Rossi, supra note 9. 
 17. JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL, 262 (2004). See 
SALLY HUNT, MAKING COMPETITION WORK IN ELECTRICITY 17-23 (2002).  
 18. HUNT, supra note 17, at 17-18; Sources of Energy—Energy Explained, What Is Energy, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=about_sources_of_energy 
(last updated Aug. 1, 2013). 
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from power plants to local distribution systems.19  The unique physical properties 
of electricity make managing the transmission system a delicate process.20  
Generally it is not possible to deliver specific electrons from a generator to a 
particular customer because electricity flows over the path of least resistance, not 
where we tell it to go.21  This makes an agreement between a customer and 
generator to purchase electricity a legal fiction—the electricity the customer 
receives could come from anywhere on the network.22  If the amount of electricity 
generated into the transmission system does not match load, a blackout can occur.23  
The physical limitations of a transmission network can lead to congestion, which 
limits the amount of electricity that can travel between two points.24   
Despite its delicacy, the transmission system fulfills several crucial functions 
besides simply carrying electrons from one location to another.  An interconnected 
transmission system can draw on many generation sources and bolsters the 
reliability of the system in the event that a generator or segment of the transmission 
network fails.25  Transmission also facilitates generator competition by making it 
possible to transport lower-cost electricity from one part of the country to another 
area with higher electricity prices.26  And, of course, transmission is critical for 
connecting far-flung renewable energy sources in remote locations to population 
centers.27 
The complexity of the transmission system means that it requires careful 
management to avoid malfunction.  System operators orchestrate the process by 
dispatching various generators to match demand.28  In New England, ISO New 
England (ISO-NE) handles system operation, among other functions.29 
The third aspect of the electricity system is distribution.30  The distinction 
between transmission and distribution is not always clear, but generally distribution 
refers to the wires that connect to and deliver electricity to residential, commercial, 
and industrial customers.31  Distribution also includes customer service functions, 
billing, and metering.32 
Finally, there is also a distinction between wholesale and retail sales of 
electricity.33  Retail sales are sales to end-users of electricity, whereas wholesale in 
this context means sales for resale.34  Though this distinction may seem trivial, it 
forms one of the boundaries between state and federal jurisdiction over electricity 
                                                                                                     
 19. TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 262. 
 20. See HUNT, supra note 17, at 30-32. 
 21. See BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 3, at 29-30. 
 22. See id. at 30. 
 23. HUNT, supra note 17, at 32. 
 24. See BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 3, at 31-32. 
 25. Id. at 8-9.  
 26. Id. at 10-11. 
 27. Id. at 9. See EWITS., supra note 5, at 27. 
 28. See HUNT, supra note 17, at 20-21. 
 29. See Overview—About ISO-NE, Company Profile, ISO NEW ENG., http://www.iso-ne.com/ 
aboutiso/co_profile/overview/index.html (last visited Sep. 14, 2013). 
 30. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 262. 
 31. See id. at 263. 
 32. See HUNT, supra note 17, at 23. 
 33. See id. at 23-24. 
 34. Id. at 23-24. 
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sales, as discussed in the next section.35 
Given the complexity, delicacy, and importance of the electricity system, it is 
hardly surprising that the industry attracted regulation.  The system’s complexity 
compounds the challenge of drawing legal distinctions and jurisdictional lines, and 
the century-long history of electricity industry regulation is defined by a struggle to 
draw these lines. 
A. A Century of Growing Federal Regulation of Electricity Transmission 
For the first fifty years of its existence, the electricity industry attracted little 
regulation.36  Technological constraints forced the first power plants in the 1880s to 
be located a short distance from customers, which initially produced a 
decentralized model for the electricity system, with many small power plants 
dispersed throughout an urban area.37  As advances in transmission technology 
allowed transportation of electricity over greater distances and the holding 
company corporate form attracted investors, the electricity industry underwent 
rapid consolidation in the early 1900s.38  As economies of scale allowed larger 
electric companies to dominate the industry, those companies became perceived by 
state regulators as natural monopolies requiring regulation to avoid abuse.39  
According to historian Robert Hirsh, at least some in the electric industry 
welcomed regulation as a monopoly because the regulation protected them from 
competition while also guaranteeing a reasonable return on investment.40  In the 
1930s, the electricity industry consisted primarily of vertically-integrated, investor-
owned utilities,41 although there were also some municipally-controlled power 
companies.42  State and local governments were the primary regulators for these 
utilities.43 
Yet state regulation of electric utilities ran into a problem—the dormant 
Commerce Clause limited states’ authority to regulate electricity sold interstate.44  
In Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 
decided in 1927, the United States Supreme Court held that states could not 
regulate interstate electricity sales.45  Rhode Island-based Narragansett Electric 
Light Company had entered a twenty-year contract with Attleboro Steam & 
Electric Company to provide, at a certain rate, electricity for distribution to the 
Massachusetts city of Attleboro.46  After the cost of generating electricity 
increased, Narragansett Company filed with the Rhode Island Public Utilities 
                                                                                                     
 35. See id. at 24 
 36. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 265-66. 
 37. See RICHARD F. HIRSH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN 
THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM 12 (1999). 
 38. See id. at 34-36; TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 265-66. 
 39. See HIRSH, supra note 37, at 20-23, 29-31. 
 40. See id. at 26-29, 33. 
 41. See HUNT, supra note 17, at 24-26. 
 42. See HIRSH, supra note 37, at 14-15. 
 43. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002); HIRSH, supra note 37, at 26. 
 44. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 5. 
 45. Pub. Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89-90 (1927). 
 46. Id. at 84. 
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Commission (PUC) a new, increased rate schedule, which the PUC granted after 
finding the old rate to be unreasonable.47  The Supreme Court held that the Rhode 
Island PUC order granting the new rate was a direct burden on interstate 
commerce, and that only Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause to 
regulate wholesale electricity transactions between states.48  The holding created 
what became known as the Attleboro gap because states lacked authority to 
regulate interstate sales and transmission of electricity, but Congress had not yet 
exercised its authority over wholesale transactions and interstate transmission.49 
The federal government began regulating the electricity industry in 1935.  
First, it indirectly regulated the industry by passing the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act of 1935 (PUHCA),50 which required utility holding companies to 
register with the SEC and was intended to curb manipulation and abuse.51  The 
PUHCA effectively confined utilities to operate within state lines and contributed 
to the traditional model of a vertically-integrated public utility that controlled the 
generation, transmission, and distribution of electricity within a state.52 
Congress then created direct federal regulation of electricity transmission and 
wholesale sales with the Federal Power Act of 1935 (“FPA”), 53 which amended 
and expanded on the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 governing hydroelectric 
dams.54  The Act created the Federal Power Commission (“FPC”), known today as 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), and Section 201(a) of the 
FPA granted FERC jurisdiction over “transmission of electric energy in interstate 
commerce and to the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.”55  
The newly created federal jurisdiction over interstate transmission and wholesale 
transactions closed the Attleboro gap.56  Congress clearly circumscribed the 
authority it granted to FERC, however, by clarifying that federal regulation of 
electricity would “extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation 
by the States.”57  Congress denied FERC, with some exceptions, jurisdiction over 
generation and distribution facilities.58  The FPA thus drew a jurisdictional line 
between, on the one hand, federal authority over interstate wholesale transactions 
and transmission and, on the other, state authority over retail sales, distribution, and 
the siting of generation and transmission facilities.59  This line defined a regulatory 
                                                                                                     
 47. Id. at 85-86. 
 48. Id. at 89-90. 
 49. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 267. 
 50. Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z) (repealed 
2005). 
 51. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 266-67. 
 52. See id. at 266-67; BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 3, at 3. 
 53. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 847 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824w 
(2006)). 
 54. Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (1920) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 791a – 823d (2006)). 
 55. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2006). 
 56. See id. § 824(b)(1); TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 267. 
 57. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a). 
 58. Id. § 824(b)(1) (“The Commission . . . shall not have jurisdiction . . . over facilities used for the 
generation of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of 
electric energy in intrastate commerce.”). 
 59. See BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 3, at 3. 
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status quo that only began to erode toward the end of the twentieth century.60 
FERC exercises its authority under the FPA primarily by setting rates for 
electricity.  Section 205 of the FPA provides that utilities may charge only “just 
and reasonable rates” for interstate transmission or sale of electricity.61  Nor may 
public utilities confer “undue preference or advantage” in setting rates or charge an 
unreasonable difference in rates between localities or types of service.62  Public 
utilities must file a schedule of rates with FERC and give notice of any changes. 
FERC may then hold a hearing to review the rates on its own initiative or upon a 
complaint.63  Pursuant to Section 206 of the FPA, if FERC determines that a rate 
was “unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential,” it must then 
determine and fix a just and reasonable rate.64 
Far from crippling the electricity industry, the FPA heralded several decades of 
incredible growth in the electricity industry.65  According to Hirsh, utility 
managers, manufacturers, consumers, regulators, and investors tacitly approved of 
a “grow-and-build strategy” for the electricity industry, which led to a feedback 
loop of lower prices and increased demand in the post-World War II decades.66  
Incremental technological innovation gradually improved generation efficiency, 
while electricity use by factories and consumers with their new household 
appliances led to increased demand.67  These two factors led to consistent declines 
in electricity prices, which kept customers and regulators happy.68  Meanwhile, the 
regulated public utilities and their investors earned back their growth costs plus a 
reasonable rate of return.69 
The electricity industry at this time, regulated within the 1935 framework of 
the FPA, built the foundation for the physical transmission system we have today.  
The state-regulated, vertically-integrated monopolies built transmission facilities to 
connect their newly-built generators to customers.70  Although some utilities 
interconnected with each other to realize reliability and efficiency gains,71 public 
utilities generally had little incentive to invite competition by building a well-
integrated transmission grid.72 
The conditions for the public utility industry’s unraveling began to appear in 
the 1960s.  A combination of stagnant efficiency gains (due to thermodynamic 
                                                                                                     
 60. See BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 3, at 3-4. 
 61. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (“All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility 
for or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges shall be just 
and reasonable.”). 
 62. Id. § 824d(b). 
 63. Id. § 824d(c)-(e). 
 64. Id. § 824e(a). 
 65. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 269. 
 66. HIRSH, supra note 37, at 46-50. 
 67. See HIRSH, supra note 37, at 46-50. 
 68. See HIRSH, supra note 37, at 46-50; TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 269. 
 69. See HIRSH, supra note 37, at 49; TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 270. 
 70. See Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 
ENVTL. L. 1015, 1018 (2009). 
 71. See ADAM VANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40657, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN 
ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION FACILITY SITING 2 (2010). 
 72. See Rossi, supra note 70, at 1018-19. 
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properties of steam turbines), higher fuel costs, the advent of environmentalism and 
the conservation movement, and insufficient generating capacity to meet demand 
contributed to the decline in the traditional vertically-integrated public utility 
model.73  At the same time, rising operating costs and huge capital investments in 
long-delayed nuclear energy facilities forced public utilities to raise rates, which 
created political pressure on state regulators and led to a drop in consumer 
demand.74 
Beginning in 1978, Congress laid the groundwork for a drastic change in the 
electricity industry when it passed the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act 
(PURPA).75  Among the goals of PURPA were conservation, increased efficiency, 
reasonable ratemaking, and better wholesale distribution.76  Section 210 of PURPA 
amended the FPA by requiring public utilities to purchase and resell power from 
independent “qualifying facilities” (QFs).77  Prior to PURPA, public utilities 
generally enjoyed a monopoly and could decline to purchase power from 
independent power generation facilities.78  After PURPA’s passage, independent 
companies could also generate and sell power created by qualifying cogeneration 
or small-scale generation facilities.79  In implementing PURPA, FERC further 
encouraged generator competition by requiring public utilities to purchase power 
generated by QFs at the “avoided costs,” which meant the higher amount it would 
have cost the public utility to generate the same energy.80  In addition, FERC had 
the authority to exempt certain non-utility generators from provisions of the FPA 
and PUHCA, which allowed for innovation in the financing and structure of 
companies owning QFs.81 
Although PURPA expanded federal regulation of electricity generation, states 
retained broad authority in regulating electricity transmission.  PURPA stopped 
short of mandating state adoption of federal policy goals, in the form of federal 
ratemaking standards, in the areas of energy efficiency and conservation.82  Instead, 
under PURPA states were required only to “consider” the federal ratemaking 
standards, and states could reject the standards after a formal hearing.83 
In FERC v. Mississippi, the Supreme Court upheld the provision of PURPA 
requiring states to consider federal ratemaking standards and the provision 
                                                                                                     
 73. See HIRSH, supra note 37, at 55. 
 74. See TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 17, at 270-71. 
 75. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat 3117 [hereinafter 
PURPA] (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a-3, 2601-2642 and throughout other titles). 
 76. 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006). 
 77. Id. § 824a-3(a). See also HUNT, supra note 17, at 41-45 (explaining single-buyer market model 
created by PURPA). 
 78. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 750-51 (1982). 
 79. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a). A cogeneration facility is one that produces electricity and “steam or 
forms of useful energy (such as heat) which are used for industrial, commercial, heating, or cooling 
purposes,” id. § 796(18)(A), whereas a small power production facility is one that uses biomass, waste, 
or renewable resources to produce electricity and has a capacity of no more than eighty megawatts, id. 
§ 796(17)(A). 
 80. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(b)(2) (2013).  See also HIRSH, supra note 37, at 89-91. 
 81. See 18 C.F.R. § 292.601-602; HIRSH, supra note 37, at 87. 
 82. PURPA, supra note 75, § 111(a). 
 83. Id. 
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requiring public utilities to purchase electricity from QFs.84  The Court held that 
these provisions did not violate the Commerce Clause, reasoning that Congress had 
a rational basis for concluding that electricity generation and transmission had an 
immediate effect on interstate commerce.85  In confronting a more difficult issue, 
the Court also held that compelling states to consider federal ratemaking standards 
did not violate the Tenth Amendment, reasoning that transmission regulation was a 
pre-emptible field.86 
Although Section 210 of PURPA attracted relatively little attention during the 
legislative debate, it had far-reaching consequences for the structure of the 
electricity industry and its regulation.87  PURPA opened the electricity generation 
market to competition, but it also revealed regulatory problems regarding 
transmission.88  Non-utility generators faced a product delivery problem: obtaining 
fair access to the public utilities’ transmission network.89  To address this problem, 
PURPA granted FERC the authority to issue orders that required public utilities to 
provide transmission services to QFs, known as “wheeling” orders.90  PURPA 
subjected FERC’s wheeling authority to a number of constraints, however, 
including the requirement that the wheeling order maintain existing competitive 
relationships and promote energy conservation.91  In addition, not all non-utility 
generators met the definition of “qualifying facility,” and thus did not enjoy the 
favorable provisions in PURPA.92 
In partial response to this transmission access problem, Congress passed the 
Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPAct 1992).93  The Act created a new entity, the 
Exempt Wholesale Generator (“EWG”), a category that encompassed independent 
power producers that previously did not qualify for QF status, and exempted them 
from PUHCA limitations on firm structure.94  EPAct 1992 also facilitated FERC’s 
wheeling authority by eliminating the requirements that a wheeling order preserve 
existing competitive relationships and promote energy conservation, although the 
order still had to be in the public interest.95  Nonetheless, some limitations on 
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FERC’s wheeling authority to order transmission access remained.  For instance, 
FERC still could not act until application by a party, although the EPAct 1992 
added “any other person generating electric energy for sale for resale” to the 
entities eligible to apply to FERC for a wheeling order.96  This limitation forced 
FERC to open transmission access to non-utility generators on a case-by-case basis, 
instead of setting a nationwide policy. 
In order to implement EPAct 1992, and also to go beyond the Act by avoiding 
the case-by-case limitation on its wheeling authority, FERC issued Order 888 in 
1996.97  FERC’s stated goal in Order 888 was “to facilitate the development of 
competitively priced generation supply options, and to ensure that wholesale 
purchasers of electric energy can reach alternative power suppliers and vice 
versa.”98  FERC acknowledged that, by itself, the case-by-case wheeling authority 
under PURPA and EPAct 1992 was insufficient to secure open transmission access 
across the country.99  To accomplish its goal, Order 888 required “all public 
utilities that own, control or operate facilities used for transmitting electric energy 
in interstate commerce . . . [t]o file open access non-discriminatory transmission 
tariffs that contain minimum terms and conditions of non-discriminatory 
service.”100  FERC intended that these open access transmission tariffs (OATTs) 
would ensure transparent pricing and minimum terms for services that a 
transmission utility “is reasonably capable of providing,” regardless of whether the 
utility currently provides those services to itself.101   
Order 888 also mandated “functional unbundling,” which required public 
utilities to separately state wholesale generation and transmission rates and also to 
take its own transmission services under the same tariff as it offered to others.102  
But FERC stopped short of a corporate unbundling requirement that transmission 
utilities divest generation facilities or create separate corporate affiliates for 
transmission and generation.103  FERC did not require unbundling of retail 
transmission and generation, but it did apply an open access requirement on retail 
access that the utility had voluntarily unbundled.104 
Unsurprisingly, public utilities and states challenged Order 888’s expansion of 
federal regulation of transmission.105  After all, in enacting EPAct 1992, Congress 
had increased FERC’s ability to issue wheeling orders but had not given FERC 
broad authority to require open transmission access.  Nonetheless, in New York v. 
FERC the Supreme Court concluded that FERC had the legal authority to mandate 
open transmission access and to require both retail and wholesale functional 
                                                                                                     
 96. Id.  
 97. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission 
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 
61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (April 24, 1996) [hereinafter Order 888]; reh’g, Order No. 888-A, 62 Fed. Reg. 
12,274 (Mar. 4, 1997); reh’g, Order No. 888-B, 62 Fed. Reg. 64,688 (Nov. 25, 1997). 
 98. Order 888, supra note 97, at 21,547. 
 99. Id. at 21,547. 
 100. Id. at  21,541. 
 101. Id. at  21,572; see BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 3, at 5. 
 102. Order 888, supra note 97, at 21,552. 
 103. Id. at  21,551. 
 104. Id. at  21,571-72. 
 105. See VANN, supra note 71, at 7. 
240 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1 
unbundling.106  In Order 888107 and before the Court,108 FERC argued that its legal 
authority to require open transmission access and functional unbundling was found 
in its ratemaking authority pursuant to Sections 205 and 206 of the FPA to remedy 
undue discrimination, and not the wheeling authority expanded in EPAct 1992.  
New York argued that FERC lacked authority over retail transmissions, an area it 
argued that Congress had left to the states.109  The Court agreed with FERC, noting 
that “the landscape of the electric industry has changed since the enactment of the 
FPA, when the electricity universe was ‘neatly divided into spheres of retail versus 
wholesale sales.’”110  Retail transmission, as well as wholesale transmission, was 
effectively interstate transmission “because of the nature of the grid.”111  The Court 
reached its conclusion despite New York’s argument that legislative history 
showed that Congress’s sole purpose in passing the FPA was to close the Attleboro 
gap, that is, regulate interstate wholesale, not retail, transmission of electricity.112  
The Court disagreed with New York’s reading of the legislative history while also 
noting, “here [legislative history] is not particularly helpful because of the interim 
developments in the electric industry.”113 
In 1999, to further its goal of achieving open, non-discriminatory transmission 
access, FERC issued Order 2000, which encouraged voluntary formation of 
independent Regional Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”) to manage and 
coordinate transmission, of which individual transmission utilities are members.114  
FERC identified two transmission-related barriers to competitive wholesale 
markets.115  First, “engineering and economic inefficiencies” resulted from 
individual transmission owners making independent decisions about use and 
expansion of the grid, even though the grid is actually part of one larger system.116  
FERC noted that increased generation competition had strained the transmission 
system.117  Second, FERC expressed concern about continued undue discrimination 
by transmission owners in the services they provided to generation competitors.118 
Even the appearance of discrimination impeded the competitiveness of the 
market.119  FERC determined that RTOs would remedy these two barriers to 
competition.120  Yet FERC decided to make participation in an RTO voluntary, 
after most of the investor-owned utilities protested against mandatory 
                                                                                                     
 106. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2002). 
 107. Order 888, supra note 97 at 21,560. 
 108. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. at 11-13. 
 109. Id. at 16. 
 110. Id. (quoting Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 691 (D.C. Cir. 
2000)). 
 111. Id. at 17. 
 112. Id. at 20. 
 113. Id. at 23. 
 114. Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 810 (Jan. 6, 2000) [hereinafter Order 2000]. 
 115. Id. at 817. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. (“It is in the economic self-interest of transmission monopolists, particularly those with high-
cost generation assets, to deny transmission or to offer transmission on a basis that is inferior to that 
which they provide themselves.”). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 825. 
2013] ALLOCATING POWER 241 
participation.121  FERC also declined to mandate a structure for an RTO, allowing 
either non-profit independent system operators (ISOs) or for-profit Transco’s, or 
some other form.122  Order 2000 set out four minimum characteristics123 and eight 
minimum functions of an RTO.124  At present, there are seven RTOs in the United 
States, including ISO-NE, which covers all six New England states.125 
Despite increased federal regulation of wholesale electricity markets and 
transmission planning, authority over transmission siting historically belonged to 
the states, and for the most part it still does.126  But Congress granted FERC 
authority over transmission siting when it passed the Energy Policy Act of 2005 
(EPAct 2005).127  EPAct 2005 added Section 216 to the FPA, which granted FERC 
backstop transmission siting authority.128  For the first time, FERC had authority 
not only to regulate interstate transmission and wholesale transaction, but also to 
approve the construction of physical transmission facilities. 
Congress split the delegated siting authority between the Department of 
Energy (DOE) and FERC.129  First, DOE must conduct a transmission congestion 
study and, based on the conclusions of that study and input from potentially 
affected states, designate “national interest electric transmission corridors” 
(“NIETCs”).130  In deciding whether to designate a NIETC, the statute directs DOE 
to consider the following factors: 
(A) the economic vitality and development of the corridor, or the end markets 
served by the corridor, may be constrained by lack of adequate or reasonably 
priced electricity; 
(B) (i) economic growth in the corridor, or the end markets served by the 
corridor, may be jeopardized by reliance on limited sources of energy; and 
(ii) a diversification of supply is warranted; 
(C) the energy independence of the United States would be served by the 
designation; 
(D) the designation would be in the interest of national energy policy; and 
(E) the designation would enhance national defense and homeland security.131 
Once DOE designates a corridor, FERC then has “backstop” authority to site 
electricity transmission facilities in certain situations: (1) when the relevant state 
lacks authority to approve the transmission facility or consider interstate benefits in 
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making a siting decision; (2) if the transmission utility cannot obtain siting 
approval because it does not serve customers in the relevant state; or (3) the state 
agency has authority to approve the siting but either withholds approval for more 
than one year or imposes conditions on approval that make the project 
economically unfeasible.132   
Congress thus allowed FERC to approve the siting of new transmission 
facilities, but FERC’s authority is conditioned first on DOE designation and then 
on state agency inaction, inability to act, or unreasonable action.133  If the 
conditions in the statute are satisfied, FERC may issue a construction permit for the 
transmission facility.134  In addition to receiving siting approval, the holder of a 
FERC-granted permit can exercise eminent domain in federal or state court to 
acquire property from hold-outs.135 
Pursuant to the newly added Section 216 of the FPA, in 2007 DOE released 
the results of its first National Electric Transmission Congestion Study.136  Two 
areas were designated Critical Congestion Areas: the Mid-Atlantic region, from 
New York City to Northern Virginia; and Southern California (Southwest Area).137  
DOE also found four Congestion Areas of Concern, one of which was New 
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England.138  Based on the critical congestion areas, DOE designated the Mid-
Atlantic National Corridor and the Southwest Area National Corridor as NIETCs 
for a duration of twelve years.139  Commenters on the draft designation voiced 
numerous concerns and arguments against the NIETC designation: Section 216 of 
the FPA violated the Fifth and Tenth Amendments; transmission companies 
improperly influenced DOE; DOE should instead focus on conservation and energy 
efficiency; DOE did not allow sufficient public input; the designated corridors 
included culturally or environmentally sensitive lands; the corridors were drawn 
too broadly; and DOE did not adequately consult with states in the corridors.140 
In the following years states and conservation groups challenged both the 
FERC and DOE aspects of the backstop siting authority conferred by EPAct 2005 
in Piedmont Environmental Council v. FERC141 and California Wilderness 
Coalition v. Department of Energy.142  Both decisions further constrained DOE and 
FERC’s already limited authority to site transmission facilities.  
In Piedmont, the Fourth Circuit in 2009 narrowly construed FERC’s siting 
authority in holding that FERC could not exercise its siting authority when a state 
actually denies a transmission siting application.143  State utility commissions and 
environmental advocacy organizations challenged FERC’s broad interpretation of 
one of the conditions triggering its backstop siting authority, when a state agency 
has “withheld approval for more than 1 year.”144  FERC interpreted “withheld” to 
include a state’s denial of a siting application.145  The Fourth Circuit, despite 
applying Chevron deference,146 held that FERC’s interpretation was contrary to the 
plain meaning of “withheld” in Section 216 of the FPA.147  The court reasoned that 
Congress intended to grant FERC only limited authority, and that FERC’s 
interpretation would effectively preempt state authority if a state utility commission 
denied a permit.148  Judge Traxler, dissenting from the majority’s interpretation of 
FPA Section 216, noted the broader purpose of EPAct 2005 to expand the 
transmission system to avoid blackouts and higher costs due to congestion.149  
Judge Traxler argued that Congress could have added “for more than 1 year” to 
“withheld” to allow a state utility commission to deny an application, change its 
mind, and grant a permit within one year.150  And Congress could not have 
intended to allow FERC siting authority when a state imposed project-killing 
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conditions but not when a state simply denied an application.151  Less than one 
month after the Piedmont decision, Acting Chairman of FERC, Jon Wellinghoff, 
asked the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources to grant FERC 
increased transmission siting authority.152  So far, Congress has declined to do so. 
Two years later, in 2011, a number of state public utility commissions and 
environmental advocacy groups challenged the DOE aspect of the backstop siting 
authority.  In particular, the challenges focused on the way DOE conducted the 
congestion study mandated by EPAct 2005 and its subsequent designation of the 
two NIETCs.153  The Ninth Circuit in California Wilderness held that DOE acted 
beyond the scope of its authority in EPAct 2005 because it failed to adequately 
consult with affected states in conducting the congestion study.154  DOE argued 
that it satisfied its obligation to consult with states through notice-and-comment 
proceedings.155  The court rejected this argument and concluded, based on the 
ordinary meaning of and case law defining “consult,” that DOE failed to consult 
with the states.156  In particular, DOE did not circulate a draft of the congestion 
study to states, did not affirmatively reach out to states, and did not provide states 
with the modeling data it used in the study, and DOE’s failure to meaningfully 
consult with the states was not harmless error.157 
In 2011, DOE solicited comments on a FERC proposal for DOE to delegate its 
congestion study and NIETC authority to FERC, which would have consolidated 
federal backstop siting authority in one agency.158  DOE ultimately decided against 
delegation, instead promising to make the congestion study and NIETC designation 
process more efficient and transparent.159  DOE has conducted public workshops 
and received comments in connection with its 2012 National Electric Transmission 
Congestion Study, but it has not yet released the final study.160  
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The recent history of the electricity industry is one of vertically-integrated, 
state-regulated public utilities suddenly confronted with competition by non-utility 
generators.  To promote competition in generation, Congress, by enacting PURPA 
and EPAct 1992, forced public utilities to open up their transmission facilities for 
use by competitors, and FERC has implemented a policy of open access to 
transmission services through Orders 888 and 2000.  In addition, in recent decades 
merchant transmission developers—non-utility transmission owners who recover 
transmission project costs by negotiating rates, not cost-based rates161—and 
independent transmission developers have introduced competition into the 
transmission-side of the electricity industry by building transmission projects not 
owned by incumbent public utilities.162 
Despite these policy and market developments, the current transmission 
infrastructure still requires significant upgrade to reliably accommodate both a 
robust wholesale electricity market and renewable energy sources.163  Siting new 
transmission lines has traditionally been the domain of the states,164 and FERC’s 
backstop siting authority in Section 216 of the FPA, especially as limited by 
Piedmont and California Wilderness, does little to change the status quo.  The next 
part of this Comment considers how states have exercised their siting authority. 
II. THE STATE ROLE IN REGULATING ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION 
State regulation of electricity transmission siting varies in several respects: 
regulatory structure; the entities that may build transmission facilities; the standards 
for granting a certificate to build a new transmission facility; and whether state 
regulators may coordinate with other states or consider out-of-state benefits in 
approving or denying a transmission project.  Some regions of the country have 
undergone at least partial deregulation of the electricity industry, where 
transmission and distribution utilities are required to divest their generation assets 
and some sort of independent operator (e.g., an ISO) operates the transmission grid 
in the region.165 
A majority of states place the authority to approve a transmission project in 
one state agency, usually a public utility commission (PUC).166  Some states have 
created siting boards composed of representatives from various state agencies.167  
The rest of the states do not consolidate siting authority in one state agency, instead 
requiring developers to seek approval from multiple agencies.168 
                                                                                                     
 161. Order 1000, supra note 11, at 49863. 
 162. See Heidi Werntz, Let’s Make A Deal: Negotiated Rates for Merchant Transmission, 28 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 424 (2011) (“Merchant transmission providers are distinguished from other 
transmission providers by the fact that they do not serve captive retail customers and assume all market 
risk of a transmission project.”). 
 163. See Rossi, supra note 70, at 1024, 1029-30. 
 164. See id. at 1019. 
 165. See Pierce, supra note 88, at 469-70. 
 166. BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 3, at 16, 18. 
 167. Id.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 69H (West 2003 & Supp. 2012). 
 168. See BROWN & SEDANO, supra note 3, at 16, 18.  See e.g., EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, STATE 
GENERATION & TRANSMISSION SITING DIRECTORY 31, 43, 103 (2012) (Georgia, Indiana, and 
Oklahoma). 
246 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1 
States also differ on whether they issue certificates to build transmission 
projects to non-public utilities, and, if so, whether a merchant transmission 
developer may apply to become a public utility.  For instance, Arkansas Public 
Service Commission (PSC) lacked authority to recognize a merchant transmission 
developer, Plains and Eastern Clean Line LLC, as a public utility so that it could 
build two transmission lines to bring renewable wind energy from Oklahoma and 
through Arkansas to other states in the southern part of the United States.169  
Although the Arkansas PSC expressed its support for merchant transmission 
development generally, it only had jurisdiction to grant a public utility the 
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity required to build a transmission 
line.170  The Arkansas PSC concluded that Clean Line was not a public utility 
within the meaning of the relevant Arkansas statute because it did not own or 
operate transmission in the state or have any contracts to deliver power in 
Arkansas.171  Oklahoma, on the other hand, granted Clean Line public utility status 
for a transmission project that would not serve the public in Oklahoma but would 
transfer windpower from Oklahoma to Tennessee.172  This example of conflicting 
regulations in neighboring states illustrates the challenge confronting merchant or 
independent transmission developers that wish to build an interstate transmission 
line. 
In many states, regulatory approval of a new transmission line is conditioned 
on demonstrated public need.173  Regulatory approval in the form of a certificate of 
public need is frequently also a prerequisite for exercising eminent domain 
authority.174  “Need” typically has a narrow meaning restricted to the necessity of 
the new transmission facility within the state only.175  One criticism of such a 
restricted meaning of “need” in the approval of transmission projects is that state 
regulators do not consider potential benefits or costs to an entire region, even 
though the development of wholesale energy markets makes it likely that new 
transmission facilities will affect several states.176 
Finally, states differ on whether their statutes allow state agencies to 
coordinate with other states for the purpose of transmission planning and siting.177  
A report by the National Council on Energy Policy from 2008 found that twelve 
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states have statutes that are silent on the issue of interstate coordination, whereas 
twenty-three states had statutes encouraging some form of interstate coordination 
for electricity regulation generally.178  Some states also encourage or require state 
agencies to participate in RTOs.179 
The rest of this Part explores how Maine, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire 
exercise their authority over transmission siting.  Maine is a potential net wind 
energy producer, and a transmission line delivering wind power generated in Maine 
to load centers would likely travel through New Hampshire and Massachusetts. 
A. Maine 
In Maine, transmission developers must apply to the Maine Public Utilities 
Commission (MPUC) for a certificate of public convenience and necessity (CPCN) 
to build a transmission line.180  A CPCN is also necessary before MPUC may grant 
a transmission and distribution utility181 eminent domain authority for transmission 
construction.182  A Maine statute imposes an extendable six-month time limit on 
the MPUC to make a determination whether to issue a CPCN.183 
The MPUC must find that a “public need” for the transmission line exists 
before granting a CPCN.184  Maine’s definition of “public need” is somewhat 
broader than many other states, in that it allows the MPUC to consider a non-
exhaustive list of relevant factors in determining public need. 
In determining public need, the commission shall, at a minimum, take into 
account economics, reliability, public health and safety, scenic, historic and 
recreational values, state renewable energy generation goals, the proximity of the 
proposed transmission line to inhabited dwellings and alternatives to construction 
of the transmission line, including energy conservation, distributed generation or 
load management.185 
By including “state renewable energy generation goals” in its statute, Maine 
allows the MPUC to consider the state’s explicit public policy of promoting 
renewable energy generation, which tends to require more transmission facilities 
than traditional fossil-fuel or hydroelectric generation.186  In addition, MPUC uses 
                                                                                                     
 178. Id. at 7-8. 
 179. Id. at 9-10. 
 180. 35-A M.R.S.A. § 3132 (2010 & Supp. 2012). 
 181. Id. § 102(20-B).(A “transmission and distribution utility” is “a person, its lessees, trustees or 
receivers or trustees appointed by a court, owning, controlling, operating or managing a transmission 
and distribution plant for compensation within the State.”). 
 182. 35-A M.R.S.A. § 3136(4) (2010) (“The commission may not approve a location to be taken by 
eminent domain for the construction, rebuilding or relocation of a transmission line that requires a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity under section 3132, unless the commission has issued a 
certificate of public convenience and necessity for that transmission line.”). 
 183. Id.  § 3132(2) (2010 & Supp. 2012). 
 184. Id. § 3132(6). 
 185. Id. 
 186. See id. § 3210(1) (“In order to ensure an adequate and reliable supply of electricity for Maine 
residents and to encourage the use of renewable, efficient and indigenous resources, it is the policy of 
this State to encourage the generation of electricity from renewable and efficient sources and to 
diversify electricity production on which residents of this State rely in a manner consistent with this 
section.”); id. § 3210(3-A) (listing renewable energy generation goals); id. § 3402 (2010) (“The 
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language almost identical to the statute in its rule implementing Section 3132.187 
Despite Maine’s relatively broad statutory definition of “public need” for 
CPCN approval, it is limited in several ways that discourage transmission 
development.  Any explicit consideration of regional transmission needs, including 
meeting other states’ renewable energy goals,188 is absent from the list in Section 
3132(6).  If, for instance, Maine could produce enough renewable energy to exceed 
its own goals, but neighboring states were failing to meet their own renewable 
goals for lack of renewable generation resources like wind or tidal power, Section 
3132(6) does not explicitly allow MPUC to consider the demand for renewable 
energy in other states.189  Additionally, eminent domain authority might be limited 
to transmission lines with a demonstrable benefit to Maine citizens.190   
Furthermore, MPUC must deny a CPCN application upon finding “that the 
transmission line is reasonably likely to adversely affect any transmission and 
distribution utility or its customers.”191  The Maine Legislature added this clause in 
2009.192  This clause, by protecting not only ratepayers but also incumbent utilities, 
adds an additional barrier for independent developers seeking to invest in new 
transmission lines.193 
                                                                                                     
Legislature finds that it is in the public interest to explore opportunities for and encourage the 
development, where appropriate, of wind energy production in the State . . . .”). 
 187. See 65-470 C.M.R. ch. 330, § 9-B (2012). For an example of MPUC applying the CPCN 
factors, see Re Cent. Me. Power Co., Request for Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity for 
the Maine Power Reliability Program Consisting of the Construction of Approximately 350 Miles of 
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 188. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25-A, § 11F (West 2010) (renewable energy portfolio 
standard). 
 189. It may, however, consider the economic benefit to Maine in transmitting excess renewable 
generation capacity to other states under the “economics” factor in Section 3132(6). 
 190. See Steven J. Eagle, Securing A Reliable Electricity Grid: A New Era in Transmission Siting 
Regulation?, 73 TENN. L. REV. 1, 14 (2005) (“While the need for siting transmission lines is regional 
and national, courts generally act on the proposition that a State cannot use its power of eminent domain 
for the benefit of the citizens of another State.  Courts find this limitation within the source of the 
legislative power; the sovereign is obligated to protect and promote the health, safety, morals, and 
welfare of citizens of the individual state.”). 
 191. 35-A M.R.S.A. § 3132(6) (2010 & Supp. 2012). 
 192. P.L. 2009, ch. 123, § 5. 
 193. The outcome of an Arkansas PSC/Clean Line scenario in Maine is not clear—whether a 
merchant transmission developer that did not own any transmission or generation assets in Maine could 
obtain a CPCN to build a transmission line through the state.  Section 3132 states that “a person may not 
construct any transmission line” without a CPCN, 35-A M.R.S.A. § 3132 (2010 & Supp. 2012), and also 
that a “person” shall file a petition with MPUC to build a transmission line of more than 69 kV, id. § 
3132(2).  The use of “person” is clearly broader than public utility, and presumably would allow a 
merchant transmission developer to petition the MPUC for a CPCN.  On the other hand, statute grants 
MPUC jurisdiction over “[a]ll public utilities and certain other entities as specified in [Title 35-A]” and 
directs it to “regulate public utilities in accordance with [Title 35-A].”  Id. § 103(2)(A)-(B).  These 
provisions limit MPUC jurisdiction to public utilities and “certain other entities,” and it is unclear 
whether “certain other entities” includes the “persons” in Section 3132 defining the requirement for a 
CPCN to build transmission.  Furthermore, even if a merchant transmission developer could obtain a 
CPCN in Maine, it may not be able to exercise eminent domain authority because a Maine statute limits 
such authority to a “transmission and distribution utility” to exercise eminent domain with the approval 
of MPUC.  Id. § 3136(1) (2010).  A “transmission and distribution utility” is “a person . . . owning, 
controlling, operating or managing a transmission and distribution plant for compensation within the 
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B. Massachusetts 
Massachusetts vests transmission siting authority in the Massachusetts Energy 
Facilities Siting Board (“Siting Board”) composed of representatives from several 
states agencies, the utilities commission, and the public.194  The Siting Board 
exercises its authority so as “to provide a reliable energy supply for the 
commonwealth with a minimum impact on the environment at the lowest possible 
cost.”195  The statute creating the Siting Board thus clearly articulates values that 
should guide siting decisions: reliability, environmental protection, and efficiency.  
The statute draws on the same values when it directs the Siting Board to review 
proposed transmission projects based on the “need for, cost of, and environmental 
impacts of transmission lines.”196  Developers must seek approval from the Siting 
Board to build a transmission project, and no other state agency may issue a permit 
for the project before the Siting Board gives its approval.197  The Siting Board must 
conduct a public hearing and make a decision on the petition within one year.198   
In addition, the Siting Board has robust backstop authority to grant a 
Certificate of Environmental Impact and Public Interest (CEIPI) for a transmission 
developer if another state or local agency delays approval, imposes conditions that 
make the project unfeasible, raises a “nonregulatory issue” like aesthetic impact or 
recreation, makes a decision inconsistent with another agency, or denies 
approval.199  The Siting Board’s backstop authority over other state and local 
agencies is therefore considerably broader than FERC’s backstop authority over 
states pursuant to Section 216 of the FPA.  The Siting Board must decide on the 
petition for a CEIPI “[a]s expeditiously as possible but in no event later than six 
months” after the petition is filed.200  The Siting’s Board CEIPI decision must be in 
writing and include findings and opinions about (1) “the need for the facility to 
meet the energy requirements of the applicant’s market area” based on agreements 
with other utilities and “energy policies as adopted by the commonwealth”; (2) “the 
compatibility of the facility with considerations of environmental protection, public 
health and public safety”; (3) the project’s consistency with state and local laws; 
and (4) “the public interest, convenience and necessity requiring construction and 
operation of the facility.”201  Like many states, Massachusetts bases its siting 
decision on need, but broadens the definition somewhat to include need based on 
energy policies, including the Massachusetts Renewable Portfolio Standard 
                                                                                                     
State.”  Id. § 102(20-B) (2010 & Supp. 2012).  A merchant transmission developer with no transmission 
or distribution assets in Maine may not to fit this definition.   
 194. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164, § 69H (West 2003 & Supp. 2013). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. § 69J (“No applicant shall commence construction of a facility at a site unless a petition for 
approval of construction of that facility has been approved by the board and, in the case of an electric or 
gas company which is required to file a long-range forecast pursuant to section sixty-nine I, that facility 
is consistent with the most recently approved long-range forecast for that company.”). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. § 69K. 
 200. Id. § 69O. 
 201. Id. 
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requirements.202  The Siting Board could find that a transmission facility was 
necessary to satisfy the Commonwealth’s renewable energy goals by, for instance, 
connecting to wind generators off Cape Cod or in the Berkshires, or in another state 
like Maine.203  Yet the Massachusetts statute is silent on the issues of interstate 
coordination204 and consideration of regional benefits in approving a transmission 
siting project. 
Massachusetts’ statute also allows any person, not just public utilities, to 
petition the Siting Board for approval of a transmission project.205  However, only 
an “electric, gas or oil company” may petition the Siting Board to issue a CEIPI in 
the event of an adverse state or local agency decision.206  Under Section 69G, an 
“electric company”, for the purposes of Siting Board jurisdiction, includes a 
corporation organized under the laws of Massachusetts or another state to 
“generate, transmit, distribute or sell electricity for ultimate use by fifty or more 
persons,” as well as the general definition of “electric company” for Chapter 164 of 
the Massachusetts General Laws.207  The general definition, in Section 1, means “a 
corporation organized under the laws of the commonwealth . . . for selling, 
transmitting, distributing, transmitting and selling, or distributing and selling, 
electricity within the commonwealth,” but does not include “a corporation only 
transmitting and selling, or only transmitting, electricity” unless that corporation is 
affiliated with a Massachusetts distribution company.208   
The general definition of “electric company” in Section 1 therefore appears to 
exclude a merchant or independent transmission developer, unless the developer is 
affiliated with a local distribution company.  The general definition also requires 
that the transmission company transmit electricity within Massachusetts, and it is 
not clear on the face of the statute whether a transmission line that merely passes 
through Massachusetts would meet this definition.209  However, the more specific 
definition of “electric company” for Siting Board jurisdiction in Section 69G does 
seem to encompass a merchant transmission developer, so long as the company 
serves at least fifty persons, and the statute does not explicitly require those persons 
to be citizens of Massachusetts.  Therefore, based on the more specific definition in 
Section 69G, it seems as though an independent or merchant transmission 
developer could petition the Siting Board for a CEIPI. 
                                                                                                     
 202. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 25-A, § 11F (West 2010 & Supp. 2013) (creating renewable 
portfolio standard). 
 203. See Alliance to Protect Nantucket Sound, Inc. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd., 858 N.E.2d 294, 
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806 (Mass. 2010) (concluding that petitioners had waived argument that developer, organized as an 
LLC, was not a “corporation” within the meaning of Section 1). 
2013] ALLOCATING POWER 251 
C. New Hampshire 
New Hampshire, like Massachusetts, has created a specific body for siting 
transmission projects—the Site Evaluation Committee, whose members are 
representatives from various state agencies.210  Unlike the Massachusetts Energy 
Facilities Siting Board, however, the Site Evaluation Committee has no authority to 
override the decisions of other state agencies.211  Instead, the Site Evaluation 
Committee receives applications for certificates to construct energy facilities, 
conducts a preliminary review of the completeness of the application within 60 
days, forwards applications to relevant state agencies, and conducts public hearings 
in affected counties.212  Within eight months each state agency reports to the Site 
Evaluation Committee its final decision on the part of the application within its 
jurisdiction, and then the Site Evaluation Committee, within nine months of 
accepting the application, denies or approves the project.213  Unlike the 
Massachusetts Siting Board with its backstop authority, the New Hampshire Siting 
Evaluation Committee lacks the authority to grant a certificate if another state 
agency denies approval.214   
If all state agencies do grant approval on a project, then the Site Evaluation 
Committee may issue a certificate “after having considered available alternatives 
and fully reviewed the environmental impact of the site or route” if it finds that the 
site and facility will be built by an applicant with technical and financial ability to 
complete the project, “[w]ill not unduly interfere with the orderly development of 
the region,” and “[w]ill not have an unreasonable adverse effect on aesthetics, 
historic sites, air and water quality, the natural environment, and public health and 
safety.”215  There is no requirement that the Site Evaluation Committee base its 
determination on a finding of “need,” although the New Hampshire legislature in 
creating the Site Evaluation Committee found that it was in the public interest that 
the state have “an adequate and reliable supply of energy in conformance with 
sound environmental principles.”216  Finally, unlike either Maine or Massachusetts, 
the New Hampshire legislature explicitly stated that the Site Evaluation Committee 
“may consult with interested regional agencies and agencies of border states in the 
consideration of certificates.”217 
One of the New Hampshire state agencies other than the Site Evaluation 
Committee with jurisdiction over transmission line siting is the New Hampshire 
Public Utilities Commission (NHPUC).218  The relevant statute provides that “[n]o 
person or business entity . . . shall . . . begin the construction of a plant, line, main, 
or other apparatus or appliance to be used therein . . . without first having obtained 
                                                                                                     
 210. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §162-H:3 (2002 & Supp. 2012). 
 211. Id. § 162-H:16. 
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the permission and approval of the [NHPUC].”219  The NHPUC jurisdiction to 
approve a transmission line is thus not limited to public utilities.  The NHPUC is 
also required to participate in:  
[A]ctivities of the New England Conference of Public Utility Commissioners, the 
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, and the New England 
States Committee on Electricity, or other similar organizations, and work with the 
New England Independent System Operator . . . to advance the interests of New 
Hampshire with respect to wholesale electric issues, including policy goals 
relating to fuel diversity, renewable energy, and energy efficiency, and to assure 
nondiscriminatory open access to a safe, adequate, and reliable transmission 
system at just and reasonable prices.220 
NHPUC is thus explicitly mandated to participate in regional transmission 
planning activities, although (understandably) the intention behind this provision 
seems more to advocate for New Hampshire’s own interests in the region rather 
than to encourage cooperation for the good of the entire region. 
Finally, the eminent domain authority that the NHPUC may confer has two 
limitations.  The first is that only a “public utility” may petition the NHPUC to 
exercise eminent domain in building a transmission line.221  A “public utility” is 
defined broadly as “every corporation, company, association, joint stock 
association, partnership and person . . . owning, operating or managing any plant or 
equipment or any part of the same . . . in the generation, transmission or sale of 
electricity ultimately sold to the public.”222  This definition seems to allow 
independent or merchant transmission developers to acquire eminent domain 
authority.  A second, more interesting limitation is that a public utility may not 
exercise eminent domain for a transmission project unless that project has been 
approved for regional cost allocation by ISO-NE.223  This provision was added in 
2012224 as a result of the proposed Northern Pass merchant transmission line.225 
States have historically had physical siting authority for electricity 
infrastructure projects like transmission and, accordingly, have established 
regulatory regimes to approve projects planned and proposed by traditional 
vertically-integrated public utilities.226  The requirement to demonstrate need 
reflects the concern in the traditional model that a monopoly utility might overbuild 
transmission facilities and pass the costs on to its captive customers in the state.227  
Nor do statutes passed decades ago contemplate the possibility of non-utility 
transmission developers, and states (inadvertently or not) have insulated incumbent 
utilities from regional competition by failing to allow state PUCs and siting 
agencies the authority to coordinate regionally and consider regional costs and 
benefits.  Limitations in state statutes and, perhaps more important, inherent lack of 
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incentive for states to evaluate projects from a regional or national perspective have 
contributed to the inability to approve and site new transmission projects.  Some 
states, as discussed above, have tried to move beyond these limitations by allowing, 
for instance, public utility commissions and siting agencies to consider public 
policy goals, like renewable energy requirements, in addition to reliability and 
efficiency.  Nonetheless, the current federalism structure for transmission 
regulation presents serious barriers to a well-integrated grid capable of supporting 
renewable energy generation and increasing system reliability.  The next Part 
explores the problems posed by federalism, before moving to possible solutions in 
Part IV. 
III. FEDERALISM ISSUES IN ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION 
There are two primary federalism issues related to electricity transmission.  
The first issue involves transmission planning and cost allocation—what 
transmission facilities should be built and who will pay for them.228  Even after 
planning and cost allocation decisions are made, however, the second issue of 
siting authority remains—who ought to approve where transmission projects get 
built.229  FERC has asserted more authority over planning and cost allocation 
through its ratemaking authority under FPA Sections 205 and 206, but, as 
discussed above, states have almost exclusive jurisdiction over siting decisions. 
Before considering potential solutions to the problems confronting 
transmission siting, this Part further defines the federalism challenges that create 
these problems.  Examples of delayed or denied transmission projects illustrate the 
problems inherent in the current federalism model for transmission regulation.  
FERC recently exercised its authority to exert more control over regional 
transmission planning and cost-allocation by issuing Order 1000.230  Order 1000 
strikes a new federalism balance and, though it concerns planning and cost-
allocation, may suggest a way to shift the federalism model for transmission siting.   
A. Defining the Issues 
As discussed above in Parts I and II, both the federal and state governments 
share jurisdiction over the electricity industry.  To the extent that those jurisdictions 
overlap, regulation of the electricity industry presents a “regulatory commons” 
problem as conceptualized by Professor Buzbee.231  A tragedy of the regulatory 
commons occurs when multiple regulators have overlapping jurisdiction over a 
problem and this overlap creates disincentives for regulators to fix the problem 
because they can deflect blame but will not be able to claim exclusive credit for a 
solution.232  These overlaps can create a jurisdictional mismatch when the primary 
government regulator’s jurisdiction is much broader or narrower than the problem 
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that needs to be addressed.233  In the case of transmission siting, there is a clear 
jurisdictional mismatch between state agencies and transmission siting: a state 
regulator’s jurisdiction is generally smaller than the regional transmission 
problem.234  In the case of interstate transmission, neighboring states have 
overlapping jurisdiction over one project.  There can even be regulatory overlap 
within a state if multiple state agencies must approve a transmission project.  And, 
finally, even federal backstop authority is split between DOE and FERC. 
Moreover and somewhat paradoxically, Professor Wiseman notes that 
renewable energy resources exhibit regulatory “anticommons” features.235  
Transmission corridors, like parcels for wind or solar development, must overcome 
numerous exclusion rights held by both private property owners and also agencies 
at multiple levels of governments with the power to deny the project.236  The 
holders of the exclusion rights have widely divergent interests, and this divergence 
impedes efforts to forge approval and agreement among all the rights holders.237 
More concretely, federalism issues arise in the context of transmission siting 
because state interests do not match regional or national interests. Although large 
transmission projects tend to have regional or even national benefits, states 
generally consider only in-state benefits to decide whether to site those projects.238  
Even if a state agency or utility commission has authority to consider regional 
benefits, it will feel pressures from local interests more acutely than a regional or 
federal entity would.239   
There are numerous examples of local and state-level opposition delaying 
projects for years (if not forever), like the Cape Wind project off the coast of 
Massachusetts.240  A more recent local example is the opposition to the proposed 
Northern Pass merchant transmission line in New Hampshire.241  The proposed line 
would carry hydroelectric power through New Hampshire, including its scenic 
White Mountains region, and ultimately connect to New England’s power grid.242  
The project as currently proposed has provoked skepticism and in some cases 
opposition among environmental groups,243 cities and towns,244 and New 
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Hampshire citizens in general.245  Regardless of these projects’ merit or lack 
thereof, these struggles highlight the discrepancy between localized, intense 
interests to restrict transmission development and the regional and national need for 
a stronger electric grid. 
B. Order 1000: A Balanced Solution for Planning 
Over the past decade, Congress and FERC have taken faltering steps toward 
increased federal and regional authority over electricity transmission planning.  
Building on Orders 888246 and 2000,247 FERC issued Order 890 in 2007 to remedy 
undue discrimination in transmission planning and access to transmission 
services.248 Citing “critical need for new transmission infrastructure” and noting 
that “vertically-integrated utilities do not have an incentive to expand the grid to 
accommodate new entries,” FERC determined that the transmission planning 
process required changes.249  FERC required public utility transmission providers, 
regardless of RTO/ISO membership, to follow certain planning principles and 
participate in a coordinated planning process.250  FERC also expected non-utility 
transmission providers to participate in these planning processes.251 
Less than five years after issuing Order 890, FERC issued Order 1000 after 
concluding that additional changes were necessary to facilitate open transmission 
planning and cost-allocation, and to prevent discrimination by public utility 
transmission providers.252  In issuing Order 1000, FERC further tipped the 
allocation of power away from states and toward RTOs for transmission planning 
and cost-allocation in order to confront the critical need for transmission 
development.253   
In general, FERC intended the reforms in Order 1000 “to work together to 
ensure an opportunity for more transmission projects to be considered in the 
transmission planning process on an equitable basis and increase the likelihood that 
transmission facilities in the transmission plan will move forward to 
construction.”254  In particular, the reforms in Order 1000 require transmission 
providers to plan ahead for new transmission projects by participating in a regional 
transmission planning process.255  The requirement in Order 1000 that utilities 
engage in regional planning goes a step beyond the non-mandatory encouragement 
of Orders 890 and 2000.  Order 1000 also requires transmission providers to 
                                                                                                     
 245. See, e.g., Beth Daley, They’re Finding the Power to Just Say No: Many in North Country Unite 
Against Hydroelectric Project, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 23, 2012, at A1. 
 246. See Order 888, supra note 97. 
 247. See Order 2000, supra note 114. 
 248. Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 72 Fed. Reg. 12,266, 
12,271 (Mar. 15, 2007) [hereinafter Order 890]. 
 249. Id. at 12,275. 
 250. Id. at 12,279.  These planning principles are “[c]oordination, openness, transparency, 
information exchange, comparability, dispute resolution, regional participation, and congestion studies.”  
Id. at 12,319. 
 251. Id. at 12,321. 
 252. See Order 1000, supra note 11, at 49,845. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 49,851. 
 255. Id. at 49,867. 
256 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1 
develop methods for spreading costs regionally and inter-regionally for new 
transmission256 and to allow non-incumbent transmission developers257 to bid on 
constructing and operating those new projects.258  Furthermore, in addition to the 
traditional reliability and economic factors considered to determine if new 
transmission facilities are needed, FERC adopted a requirement that local and 
regional transmission planning processes also consider “public policy 
requirements” established by state or federal laws or regulations, such as state 
renewable portfolio standard requirements.259 
The regional planning process required by Order 1000 expands the regional 
cooperation and information sharing among transmission providers required by 
Order 890 and further requires that planning proceed according to principles that 
were merely voluntary under Order 890.260  It remains to be seen how transmission 
providers will implement Order 1000, but by mandating regional planning 
according to defined principles, Order 1000 should alleviate some of the 
transmission scarcity and development delay problems caused by local opposition 
and public utilities pursuing their own short-term self-interest.261 
Another controversial reform in Order 1000 requires regional transmission 
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method to spread costs among beneficiaries for regional transmission projects, Order 1000 provides a 
process to solve one of the thorniest issues preventing new transmission projects.  See Id. at 49,929; 
Brown & Rossi, supra note 9, at 762.  FERC even stated that it has the legal authority to require 
beneficiaries of regional transmission projects to pay involuntarily for costs, even if the beneficiary does 
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Order 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,925.  FERC also declined to adopt a nationwide method for cost 
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controversial requirement during an already controversial rulemaking, but a national standard for cost 
allocation could provide consistency and certainty for independent transmission developers.  On the 
other hand, there are considerable differences between interregional needs, especially between 
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planning entities to consider public policy requirements in federal and state laws 
and regulations in addition to the traditional considerations of reliability and 
economic efficiency.262  Perhaps the most important public policy requirements that 
regional transmission planning entities must now consider are state renewable 
portfolio standards.  Although the order merely required “consideration” of such 
requirements, the consideration of state renewable energy goals should address one 
primary barrier to meeting those goals.  By planning ahead for future transmission 
demand based on expected new renewable electricity generation instead of 
approving transmission projects on an ad hoc basis, RTOs and other regional 
planning entities can reduce the time and cost required to get clean energy hooked 
to the grid. 
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, Order 1000 eliminates the federal 
right of first refusal for incumbent transmission developers for regional 
transmission projects.263  FERC found this reform necessary to increase 
competition in constructing and providing transmission services;264 in that sense, it 
may signal the beginning of a competitive transmission market similar to the 
reforms that led to a competitive wholesale electricity generation market in the 
1990s.265  Before Order 1000 eliminated the federal right of first refusal, an 
incumbent transmission developer—such as a public utility—had the opportunity 
to construct a regional transmission project proposed by a non-incumbent 
transmission developer, such as a merchant transmission company.266  Public 
utilities could potentially use this power to stifle increased transmission access for 
new forms of electricity generation built by QFs and independent power producers 
or to bar new entrants to the transmission market.267  To address this concern, 
Order 1000 requires regional planning processes to include standards for 
submitting and proposing regional transmission projects, and further requires that 
non-incumbent transmission developers have an opportunity to allocate costs of 
projects regionally.268  In eliminating the federal right of first refusal, FERC had to 
walk a fine line between encouraging competition through new, smaller, and 
perhaps more innovative transmission developers, on the one hand, and alienating 
the traditional transmission utilities that remain crucial to maintaining reliability 
and expanding the nation’s transmission systems.  Ultimately, FERC in Order 1000 
tipped the balance of power away from incumbent public utilities and toward non-
incumbent competitors. 
Needless to say, public utilities and incumbent transmission providers in many 
parts of the country opposed the elimination of a federal right of first refusal.269  
                                                                                                     
 262. See id. at 49,876. 
 263. Id. at 49,880.  An incumbent transmission developer or provider is “entity that develops a 
transmission project within its own retail distribution service territory or footprint.” Id. 
 264. See id. at 49,880-81. 
 265. Contra Pierce, Restructuring, supra note 88, at 461 (“Transmission and distribution remain 
natural monopoly functions. No one except the folks at the Cato Institute support deregulation of 
transmission or distribution.”). 
 266. Order 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. at 49,880. 
 267. See id. at 49,885. 
 268. Id. at 49,880. 
 269. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public 
Utilities, 77 Fed. Reg. 32,184, 32,238-40 (May 17, 2012) [hereinafter Order 1000-A]. 
258 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1 
One major concern was that small, non-incumbent transmission developers who, 
unlike existing public utilities, have no obligation to serve customers, could 
propose a new transmission project, start construction, but then walk away if costs 
or an economic shift caused the project to become unprofitable.270  There was also 
opposition to FERC mandated regional transmission planning271 and consideration 
of public policy requirements in evaluating the need for new transmission 
facilities.272  In response to concerns, FERC issued two orders on rehearing and 
clarification: Order 1000-A in May 2012273 and Order 1000-B in October 2012.274  
Both orders affirmed the basic reforms in Order 1000, which set up a pending legal 
challenge to Order 1000 in the D.C. Circuit.275 
C. ISO-NE Order 1000 Compliance Filing 
FERC required each regional planning entity or RTO to submit a compliance 
filing describing how it expected to comply with Order 1000’s requirements.276  
ISO-NE submitted its compliance filing on October 25, 2012.277 The comments and 
protests to the filing illustrate the dynamics of the various interests in the 
transmission system, including state regulators, public utilities, merchant and 
independent transmission developers, generators, and environmental and 
conservation groups.  Although the compliance filing addressed planning and cost 
allocation, the debate it generated is similar to debates over transmission siting. 
For instance, to comply with Order 1000’s required process to identify 
transmission needs driven by public policy requirements (e.g., RPS goals) and 
evaluate potential solutions, ISO-NE proposed to have state regulators drive the 
process.278  The New England States Committee on Electricity (NESCOE), 
composed of regulators from the New England states, would have identified their 
own transmission needs created by RPS policies, and then selected proposed 
solutions for further evaluation, eventually choosing projects to place in the 
regional transmission plan.279  This plan was supported by incumbent transmission 
members of ISO-NE, but few other stakeholders.280  NESCOE, in its comments 
suggesting changes to the compliance filing, argued that states must have the 
central, “determinative” role in determining how to meet transmission needs 
created by the state’s public policy.281  Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode 
Island separately commented to make a similar point.282  The American Wind 
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Energy Association (AWEA) and, interestingly enough, the Maine PUC sounded 
alarm at too much state control over the process and argued that ISO-NE must 
make the final determination whether a proposed solution met an identified 
transmission need.283  Ultimately, FERC agreed with AWEA and MPUC, and 
required ISO-NE to submit a further compliance filing with a procedure not driven 
solely by states.284 
IV. POTENTIAL SITING SOLUTIONS: ALLOCATING POWER BETWEEN THE FEDERAL 
AND STATE REGULATORS 
Even if a regional approach, where the federal government sets limits within 
which RTOs and state members may operate, strikes the right federalism balance 
for transmission planning, an imbalance remains with respect to transmission 
siting.  In other words, once a transmission project is planned, the transmission 
developer must then secure siting approval to build the transmission lines in a 
specific area.  Such siting approval authority is currently concentrated at the state 
level, despite the recent attempt in EPAct 2005 to create and extend federal siting 
authority.285 
After President Obama took office in his first term, several Senators and 
Representatives proposed legislation that would have granted FERC more authority 
over transmission approval and siting.286  Although none of these proposals made it 
out of committee in President Obama’s first term, there is always the possibility, 
however remote, of similar proposals during his second term. In addition, the need 
for increased transmission to meet national reliability goals and to facilitate 
renewable energy development has led some commentators287 and regulators288 to 
call for a stronger federal presence in transmission siting and approval decisions.   
This Section surveys and evaluates various proposals for finding a new, more 
efficient federalism balance for electricity transmission siting authority.  First, in 
the most extreme option, Congress could simply preempt state siting authority, as it 
has for natural gas pipeline289 and LNG terminal290 siting.  Second, instead of 
completely preempting state authority, Congress could adopt a “process 
preemption” regime, where initial siting authority remains with the state within 
federally-articulated limits.291  Neither of these first two options may be politically 
feasible, nor wise policy, however.  Even if some level of federal preemption of 
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state siting authority is desirable, political obstacles may necessitate action that 
does not require Congress.  Therefore, third, FERC and other federal agencies292 
may be able to improve regional cooperation in siting decisions.  Finally, there are 
steps states could take to improve siting interstate transmission lines.  For instance, 
the inclusion of a proposed transmission line in a regional plan approved by an 
RTO or other regional entity could carry with it a presumption of public need and 
convenience at the state-level siting decision. 
A. Federal Solutions: Variations on Preemption 
The first set of solutions involves varying levels of federal preemption of state 
siting authority.  Preemption has the advantage of placing jurisdiction with an 
entity (i.e., FERC) in a position to consider regional and national benefits when 
determining whether to approve and where to site a transmission project.  These 
approaches require action from Congress and would likely generate opposition 
from states and perhaps incumbent utilities and thus may not be politically feasible.  
In addition, the preemption options may not be good long-term policy, because 
preemption risks alienating states and undermining local autonomy. 
1. Complete Federal Preemption 
Some commentators have called for complete federal preemption of state and 
local siting authority by granting FERC full authority to approve the siting of 
interstate transmission lines.293  Some have even suggested that FERC should have 
jurisdiction over interstate and intrastate transmission lines above a given 
voltage.294  Centralized siting authority with one federal regulator would greatly 
streamline the siting approval process for transmission developers and allow 
transmission projects to catch up to demand created by renewable energy 
sources.295  Complete preemption would also take transmission siting out of the 
hands of state and local regulators, who feel pressure from the parochial and 
protectionist interests at the local level that stifle transmission projects.296   
There are several examples of federal preemption in other areas of energy 
regulation that could serve as models for transmission siting.  In 1938, Congress 
preempted state authority to regulate natural gas interstate transportation and 
sales.297  Congress vested FERC’s predecessor, the Federal Power Commission, 
exclusive authority to regulate natural gas.298  Any company wishing to sell or 
transport natural gas goes to FERC, and not a state or local regulatory body, to 
obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity.299  A more recent 
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preemption example appears in the EPAct of 2005, where, in addition to granting 
FERC backstop siting authority over electricity transmission, Congress delegated to 
FERC the authority to site liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals, a power 
previously exercised by state and local governments.300  The siting of LNG 
terminals may be even more contentious and subject to pressure at the state and 
local levels than electricity transmission siting, and Congress decided that 
preemption was necessary to site LNG terminals. 
Preemption of state authority over natural gas regulation and LNG terminal 
siting provide a potential template for granting FERC exclusive electricity 
transmission authority.301  Nonetheless, there are some significant differences 
between transmission lines, on the one hand, and natural gas pipelines and LNG 
terminals on the other.  Natural gas pipelines are typically buried underground and 
therefore do not raise the aesthetic concerns of tall electricity transmission towers 
and lines.  And, although LNG terminals may mar the view of the coastline,302 they 
are confined to a localized area, whereas transmission lines stretch for miles.  
Given the greater visibility and land impact of transmission lines and towers, states 
and municipalities may resist federal preemption of electricity transmission siting 
more strongly than preemption of natural gas pipeline of LNG terminal siting. 
Setting aside the issue of whether natural gas regulation or LNG siting are apt 
precedents for preemption of transmission siting authority, complete preemption 
may not be desirable as a matter of policy.303  By consolidating siting authority in 
one federal agency, FERC, the complete preemption approach may carry increased 
risks of agency capture by incumbent public utilities.  Instead of needing to capture 
multiple agencies in various states, incumbent transmission developers would only 
need to court regulators in one agency.  In addition, incumbent transmission 
utilities are far more likely than local opposition groups to have the necessary 
funding and expertise to persuade a federal agency located in Washington, D.C.304  
Of course, avoiding parochialism and local obstruction is a benefit of preemption, 
but it does disempower local citizens and groups.  Finally, federal preemption is 
probably not politically feasible, at least at present.305  State governments and 
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regulators likely will not give up control over transmission siting without a fight, 
just as New England states resisted ceding authority over evaluating and approving 
public policy transmission upgrades in their comments on the ISO-NE compliance 
filing.  On the other hand, given current state budget challenges, perhaps some state 
legislatures would cede siting authority over transmission siting in order to cut 
spending on state public utility commissions. 
2. Partial, Process Preemption and Coordinated Federalism 
An alternative to both complete federal preemption and the status quo for 
transmission siting would be to partially shift the federalism balance for siting 
toward the federal government and FERC.  For instance, concluding that “neither 
the federal government nor the state governments acting alone have the capacity to 
implement federal siting policies,”306 Professor Ashira Pelman Ostrow has 
proposed a “process preemption” approach for facilities siting that would combine 
federal and local authority.307  Instead of the current balance of federal, state, and 
local authority, however, she would reset the balance using as a model the cell 
phone tower siting process defined by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 
(TCA).308  The TCA allows state and local governments to retain decision-making 
authority over cell phone tower siting, but it places limits on this authority by 
prohibiting state or local governments from “unreasonably discriminat[ing] among 
providers” and from blocking provision of wireless service309; by requiring state 
and local governments to respond to requests to site cell phone towers “within a 
reasonable period of time”310; by requiring a denial to “be in writing and supported 
by substantial evidence contained in a written record”311; by preventing a denial 
based on “environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that 
such facilities comply with the Commission's regulations.”312  In addition, the TCA 
provides for judicial review for “[a]ny person adversely affected by any final action 
or failure to act by a State or local government or any instrumentality thereof that is 
inconsistent” with the above limitations.313  The substantive limitations the TCA 
places on state and local governments—the prohibitions on discrimination, blanket 
bans of cell phone towers, and using environmental effects if the tower complies 
with federal regulations—impose some national uniformity on cell phone tower 
                                                                                                     
 306. Ostrow, supra note 14, at 323 (“Federal siting regimes thus present a classic interjurisdictional 
regulatory problem that cannot be effectively remedied by a regulatory regime that exclusively 
empowers one level of government.”).   
 307. Ostrow, supra note 14, at 321. See also Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Land Law Federalism, 61 
EMORY L.J. 1397, 1435-36 (2012) (suggesting a local-officials-as-federal-agents model for allocation of 
land use authority between federal and local government); Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Pelman Ostrow, 
Cooperative Federalism and Wind: A New Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1049, 1091-97 (2009) (using TCA as a model to propose cooperative federalism approach for wind 
energy generation siting). 
 308. Ostrow, supra note 14, at 317-20. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 332 
(2006). 
 309. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i). 
 310. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(ii). 
 311. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). 
 312. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv). 
 313. Id. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). 
2013] ALLOCATING POWER 263 
siting.314  More important, as Professor Ostrow contends, the procedural 
protections in the TCA—the reasonable time for responses, the requirements of 
written denials supported by substantial evidence, and judicial review—“increase 
the transparency and consistency of the local siting process and facilitate judicial 
review of individual siting decisions,” and “enhance the public’s perception of 
fairness in the decision-making process, increasing public acceptance of the 
ultimate result.”315 
Professor Ostrow proposes applying a “process preemption” approach to 
renewable energy generator siting.316  In particular, she focuses on siting wind 
energy generation facilities.317  Although Professor Ostrow does not suggest 
adopting a process preemption or cooperative federalism approach to electricity 
transmission siting, such an application seems like a consistent extension of her 
proposal, as Professors Klass and Wilson suggest.318 The parochialism, 
protectionism, and NIMBYism problems that afflict wind turbine siting319 are 
similar to those that impede transmission line siting.  At the same time, the benefits 
of expertise and regulatory experimentation at the state and local level are as 
relevant for electricity transmission as they are for wind turbines.320 
Under a process preemption regime for electricity transmission siting, 
Congress could direct FERC to promulgate minimum procedural protections and 
substantive limitations that all state and local governments must follow when 
considering an application for a transmission siting project.321  This is similar to 
FERC’s action in Order 890, in which FERC articulated principles utilities had to 
follow in planning but left determinations about how to comply with those 
principles to the utilities.  The procedural and substantive parameters of a siting 
coordinated federalism regime could apply only to transmission lines over a given 
voltage, although that might have the adverse side-effect of encouraging states to 
favor lower voltage transmission lines that may not be capable of meeting regional 
transmission needs.322 
Like the TCA, Congress could require siting decisions to be made by states 
within a reasonable time, in writing, and based on substantial evidence, as well as 
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allow for federal judicial or FERC review.323  Congress could even go so far as to 
require state public utilities commissions or other siting approval entities to 
consider regional costs and benefits in their siting decisions.  If Congress ever 
adopts a federal RPS or renewable energy policy, it could require that regional, 
state, and local officials consider that federal RPS or policy in making transmission 
decisions. At the same time, such an approach would leave discretion at the state 
and local level to account for regional differences and still allow for transparency 
and public participation by non-market participant stakeholders.324 
Despite the attractiveness of a coordinated federalism or process preemption 
approach to transmission siting, there are some key problems.  First, as Professor 
Ostrow acknowledges, there have been some notable examples of failed 
coordinated federalism regimes.325  One of these is the scheme established by the 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments of 1985 to dispose of low-level 
radioactive waste.326  Aside from the Supreme Court striking down as 
commandeering the take-title provision of the Act,327 what remained of the low-
level waste scheme was insufficient to encourage states to site nuclear waste 
disposal facilities.328   
Although the process preemption scheme in the TCA has been more successful 
for siting cell-phone towers,329 there are some key differences between cell phone 
tower siting and electricity transmission line siting.  First, as the history of the 
electric industry and its regulation shows, there are already thoroughly entrenched, 
divergent interests in electricity transmission (and generation and distribution), 
more so than the wireless telecommunications industry in 1986, when the TCA was 
enacted.  Second and similarly, any new transmission development becomes part of 
an already established, delicate transmission network, whereas cell phone towers 
are standalone structures, which makes siting them easier.  Finally, a key part of the 
problem in the electricity transmission siting status quo is the inability to account 
for regional differences, and it is not clear why continuing to allow states even 
federally-circumscribed control over the siting process would solve this part of the 
problem. 
Moreover, legal and practical issues arise when state agencies must implement 
federal statutes.  For instance, there are unsettled procedural and administrative law 
questions about how a federal court would review a state agency implementing 
federal siting standards according to federally-articulated procedural safeguards.330  
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Aside from these questions and even providing for federal judicial review, the 
likely regional and state variation in implementing a federal siting standard could 
undermine the standard’s benefits, allowing states to reassert parochial interests.  
Finally, as Klass and Wilson acknowledge, Congress does not seem likely to pass 
an act completely overhauling the electricity transmission siting regime in the near 
future, especially in the face of staunch state opposition.331 
3. Conditional Preemption: Increase FERC’s Backstop Siting Authority 
An alternative proposal to facilitate transmission siting would simply be for 
Congress to expand the backstop siting authority it delegated to FERC when it 
added Section 216 to the FPA in enacting EPAct 2005.332  Congress could 
essentially overrule the Piedmont Environmental Council333 decision by amending 
Section 216334 to allow FERC to issue a construction permit for a transmission 
project when a state has denied approval of the project, and not just when a state 
has withheld approval.335  This proposed solution of course involves questions 
similar to the process preemption solution about whether Congress is likely to enact 
such a solution in the near future. 
Alternatively, despite the Piedmont Environmental Council decision,336 FERC 
could attempt to assert a broad interpretation of its backstop siting authority in 
NIETCs outside the Fourth Circuit.  Given that the Supreme Court denied cert337 
for the Piedmont Environmental Council decision, however, FERC might face a 
substantial risk of a similar outcome in other circuits.  The Supreme Court could 
have denied cert to wait for a split among the circuits to emerge if FERC forced the 
issue.  But of course FERC risked using its resources only to lose again in other 
circuits and providing opponents of broad FERC authority further advantage. A 
more immediate and difficult challenge for FERC is that DOE has designated only 
two NIETCs in which FERC may exercise its backstop authority, one in Southern 
California and another in the Mid-Atlantic.338  Piedmont Environmental Council 
was limited to the Mid-Atlantic corridor, so FERC could only attempt to exercise 
its broad interpretation of its backstop authority in the Ninth Circuit.  And this 
attempt, of course, would have little effect on New England. 
Aside from obvious questions about the political or legal feasibility of this 
solution, the low number of DOE-designated NIETCs leads to a more fundamental 
problem with expanding FERC’s backstop siting authority: it may not be fast or 
extensive enough to alleviate transmission problems.  It takes years for DOE to 
complete its congestion studies, and affected states fight even designation in an 
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NIETC, as California Wilderness illustrates.  FERC’s backstop authority as 
presently configured is thus limited by the NIETC limitation, and the inefficiency 
of the NIETC process leads to the conclusion that increased FERC backstop siting 
authority may not be enough to address transmission siting issues.  Even if 
Congress explicitly gave FERC authority to approve a transmission project when a 
state denied the project, it would likely be years between the initial application to 
the state and approval by FERC.  In that time, a project’s investors would likely 
move on to other projects. 
B. State-based Solutions 
Even if no federal or regional solution to the transmission problem is 
forthcoming, there are reforms that states could implement to improve the 
coordinated exercise of their siting authority.  First, as discussed above in Part II, 
states often adopt a narrow standard for siting transmission projects based on need 
or efficiency.339  Ashley Brown and Professor Rossi even suggest eliminating the 
need determination altogether because developers are unlikely to build 
uneconomical transmission projects.340  A less extreme solution would be for state 
legislatures to tailor the need determination to include regional benefits of 
transmission projects and, less controversially, in-state benefits that might accrue 
from economic development or exporting renewable energy.341 
As an alternative or supplement to a broader definition of “public need” for 
siting and permitting a transmission project, states could also adopt a rebuttable 
presumption of need based on a project’s approval in the RTO or regional planning 
process.  The proposal would place the burden on project opponents to show that a 
transmission project was not necessary, which may affect the outcome in at least 
some siting decisions.  This proposal thus would have benefits similar to vesting 
RTOs or regional planning entities with siting authority, but it has the advantage of 
not (legally, though it may politically) requiring states to act together.  It would 
also preserve state autonomy by allowing state siting agencies to act against the 
presumption.  Of course, the risk of such autonomy is to allow states and local 
opponents to reassert parochial interests and delay or kill transmission projects. 
In addition, state legislatures and courts could expand their eminent domain 
statutes and doctrines to allow non-utility, independent, and merchant transmission 
developers to petition for eminent domain authority.342  This would eliminate the 
advantage public utilities hold over merchant and independent transmission 
developers in negotiating rights-of-way for new projects and facilitate those 
developers’ ability to improve the transmission system.343 
Finally, state legislatures can direct their public utilities commissions or state 
siting agencies to coordinate with neighboring states and participate in the regional 
transmission planning process.344 
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C. Recommendation: Vest Siting and Permitting Authority at the Regional Level 
The federal preemption and state-based solutions still face limitations, despite 
their probable benefits.  Granting FERC some form of preemptive power over 
siting might undermine public participation in siting decisions that could result in 
concentrated local effects.  This consequence is part of the benefit of the solution, 
but FERC-based siting authority may swing the pendulum too far away from local 
autonomy and alienate state and local regulators.345  The state-based reforms, on 
the other hands, are on their own insufficient to address the nationwide shortage in 
transmission and do not change the understandable incentives states have to protect 
their own interests. 
The best approach for solving the transmission federalism problem is to vest 
siting authority over interstate transmission lines in RTOs or other regional 
transmission planning entities created as a result of Order 1000.346  This approach 
would build on the reforms made to regional planning and cost allocation in Order 
1000347 and extend the advantages of those reforms to siting.  And, because Order 
1000 directs RTOs to consider state public policy needs in making planning 
decisions, RTOs would already be able to consider those needs in making siting 
decisions. 
Vesting RTOs or regional planning entities with this power could occur in at 
least two ways.  First, Congress could delegate siting authority directly or delegate 
the power to FERC (as in the complete preemption approach) but instruct FERC to 
delegate such authority to regional entities.  Second, state members of RTOs or 
regional planning entities could voluntarily cede their inherent siting authority and 
agree to be bound by RTO siting decisions.  Conventional wisdom and the states’ 
protests in the ISO-NE Order 1000 compliance filing suggest that the latter option 
is unlikely, and thus this solution would require Congressional action which, as 
discussed above, is unlikely.  However, some states at least may be willing to give 
up their transmission siting authority if they received other benefits in return.  For 
instance, states like Maine with more renewable energy generation resources than 
in-state demand for electricity produced by those resources may cede some 
transmission siting authority for interstate lines, if doing so would make it more 
likely that the transmission system would allow the state to export its renewable 
energy.  States with insufficient or inefficient renewable resources to meet RPS 
goals may be inclined to delegate transmission siting authority, if doing so would 
result in the ability to import renewable energy. 
This approach combines the efficiency advantages of a preemptive approach 
by mitigating state externalities in exercising siting authority, but would also, if 
structured properly, allow for greater transparency and stakeholder input.  Vesting 
siting authority in RTOs or regional planning entities also allows for some 
flexibility to account for regional differences.  One concern, however, is that the 
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same concerns FERC expressed in Orders 890 and 1000 about undue 
discrimination and influence by public utility transmission providers in the RTO 
process could arise in the context of siting decisions.348  This limited, regional 
preemption approach might allow large incumbent transmission utilities to avoid 
state regulators and seek approval for projects from the politically unaccountable 
RTO.349  However, applying the strong reforms in Order 1000 related to fairness in 
planning and cost-allocation to regional siting decisions could mitigate this 
concern. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The United States faces a shortage in electricity transmission infrastructure, 
not only to meet basic reliability standards and relieve congestion, but also to 
implement renewable energy policies.  The current federalism structure for 
regulating electricity transmission contributes to this national problem.  The federal 
government exercises authority over the inherently interstate activity of electricity 
transmission and wholesale transactions, but states continue to hold their traditional 
authority over siting decisions.  States and public utilities have interests that often 
conflict with regional and national transmission needs.   
To alleviate this problem, it is necessary to shift the balance of power between 
the states and federal government over transmission siting.  The question then 
becomes how much shifting is sufficient to address the problem while also 
maintaining a reasonable degree of state and local autonomy.  Congress in EPAct 
2005 attempted to tip the balance toward the federal government by granting FERC 
backstop siting authority, but the limitations on this authority rendered the reform 
insufficient.  There are a number of proposals at the federal and states levels that 
would mitigate the federalism problems in transmission siting, but a solution 
focused at the regional level seems best suited to balance the need for regional 
transmission development with the benefit of preserving state and local 
participation. 
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